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POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY: HOW NARROWING THE SCOPE OF
ARBITRATION AND LIMITING PROCEDURAL PROTECTIONS CAN
PROMOTE SOCIAL TRUST AND JUSTICE
Adrienne Baker *
We necessarily give police officers considerable discretion
in carrying out their job. With this discretion, there is a heightened
risk that officers will engage in misconduct. And unlike other
fields, misconduct by police officers “can leave [a] victim dead or
permanently damaged, and under the right circumstances one
cop’s bad call—or a group of cops’ habitual [bad behavior]—can
be the spark that leaves a city like Baltimore in flames.” Given
these realities of modern American policing, it is critical to ensure
that police disciplinary procedures reflect not just a respect for
due process, but also a respect for the opinions of the public that
the police department serves.
-

Stephen Rushin 1

*

Adrienne Baker graduated summa cum laude from Mitchell Hamline
School of Law in 2021 where she was president of the Alternative Dispute
Resolution Society. She holds a B.A. in English Literature from UCLA and an
M.A. in English Literature from Middlebury College’s Bread Loaf School of
English. Adrienne would like to extend a big thank you to the Minnesota
ACLU chapter for their commitment to advancing police reform policies; their
conversations inspired her to write this paper in her arbitration class with
Professor Henry Allen Blair, whom she would also like to thank.
1 Stephen Rushin, Police Disciplinary Appeals, U PENN L. REV. 593,
546 (2019).
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I.

INTRODUCTION

There have been renewed and urgent conversations about
race and police brutality in the wake of George Floyd’s murder, and
the city of Minneapolis remains central to these conversations. One
block away from the third precinct police station, which is still
fenced off, the local bookstore remains covered in plywood; drawn
in huge pink and white font reads: “Abolish the Police.” 2
While many people support system-wide police reform, few
agree on how to enact it. Yet, one thing is clear: our current system
of police accountability is not working. Police discipline is
hampered by too many procedural protections. Officers have
contractual protections, statutory protections, and judge-made
protections including: (1) arbitration; (2) collective bargaining; (3)
statutory Bill of Rights; and (4) qualified immunity. These layers of
disciplinary protections compound like armor. In order to have
police reform that actually reflects a more just system, all
procedural protections must be analyzed in turn. Arbitration is only
one part, and it may not even be the most significant. But it is clear
that arbitration can impede police accountability.
Arbitration, as a mechanism to resolve disputes, is tethered
to police disciplinary appeals. This paper will examine the history
of police unions and the unique role arbitration plays in police
accountability. It will also look at Minnesota’s recent statutory
changes to police officer grievance arbitration, concluding that
Minnesota’s recent law does not go far enough to create substantive
change. Under the new law, officers still have too many protections
in the police disciplinary appeals process. In order to restore public
trust in law enforcement and promote justice and healing, police
procedural protections must be significantly reduced.

2

Photo on file with author.
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II.

HISTORY OF POLICE UNIONS

At the turn of the twentieth century, many industries began
to unionize around better working conditions. 3 Law enforcement
was no different, and it, too, created unions to advocate for better
pay and increased job autonomy. 4 For example, in 1919, Boston
police officers regularly worked between seventy-three to ninetyeight hours per week. 5 It was these stark working conditions that
made officers choose to unionize and affiliate with the American
Federation of Labor (AFL). 6 But in response, the Boston police
chief suspended more than fifteen union leaders, and when news of
this the suspension spread, nearly seventy-five percent of the Boston
police officers walked off the job. 7 With a shrunken police force,
violence and looting became rampant; cities became more
concerned about strikes, causing “a huge backlash against
government employee unions, generally, and police unions, in
particular.” 8 Consequently, many government employees didn’t
unionize until after World War II. 9
It was not until the 1960s Civil Rights Era that police unions
began to grow. Police officers rallied to unionize because they did
not feel like they had protection within the police department. 10 The
“rank-and-file officers felt attacked by the civil rights movement’s
focus on police brutality and racism.” 11 It was within this context
that police unions negotiated for disciplinary protections in their
contracts, and ultimately succeeded. 12 Looking back, it is clear that
there is a long history between police discipline procedural

3

Catherine L. Fisk & L. Song Richardson, Police Unions, 85 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 712, 734 (2017).
4
Id.
5
Id.
6
Id. at 735.
7
Id.
8
Id. at 735–36.
9
Id. (Notably, however, even in the 1960s, cities still had the power to
ban officers from joining unions, and so police departments regularly fired
officers that tried to unionize).
10
Id. at 736.
11
Id.
12
Id. at 736–37.
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protections and civil rights—and it remains clear that this tension
continues into 2022.
III.

THE UNIQUE ROLE OF ARBITRATION IN POLICE
ACCOUNTABILITY

Since 1925, the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) has been
judicially interpreted to have created a national policy favoring
arbitration. 13 As a result, arbitration has left its humble beginnings
as a way to resolve commercial disputes efficiently and is now a
rather ubiquitous way for any dispute to be adjudicated. The
Supreme Court has consistently ruled in favor of arbitration—even
over procedural protections that states have attempted to
implement. 14
In many police union contracts, there are multiple
opportunities to appeal disciplinary sanctions, and they generally
end with the right to appeal disciplinary decisions to binding
arbitration. 15 While arbitrators are theoretically neutral third-party
players, it is important to note that their actions have no real
democratic accountability. 16 This is problematic because this
framework creates a barrier to officer accountability. 17 For example,
although a police officer may have been fired for misconduct, the
arbitrator will often have the final say on appeal. Many police
contracts do not provide explicit limitations to an arbitrator’s
authority; as a result, many arbitrators have the opportunity to reevaluate a supervisor’s disciplinary decisions on both factual and
legal grounds. 18 As Stephen Rushin points out, “it seems
independently problematic if the appeals process results in the
systematic overturning of just decisions made by democratically
accountable actors.” 19 Police unions may argue that democratic
13

Thomas E. Carbonneau & Henry Allen Blair, Cases & Materials on
Arbitration Law & Practice 95–96 (8th ed. 2019).
14
Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 14–17 (1984).
15
Stephen Rushin, Police Disciplinary Appeals, U PENN L. REV. 588
(2019) [hereinafter Rushin, Police Disciplinary Appeals].
16
Id. at 552.
17
Id. at 546.
18
Id. at 548.
19
Id. at 581.
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actors are not sufficiently detached from their re-election cycle to
make truly impartial decisions. 20 Consequently, officers likely feel
more comfortable with arbitrators who are third-party neutrals. 21
But as recent reporting indicates, arbitration is responsible
for reinstating many fired officers. While many police chiefs do the
right thing in police disciplinary cases, their decisions are often
symbolic. 22 For example, a police officer in Oakland killed an
unarmed, twenty-year-old man in 2007, and just months later this
officer shot another unarmed man in the back multiple times as he
ran away. 23 That man also died. 24 In response, the city fired the
officer and settled with the deceased man’s family for $650,000. 25
But an arbitrator subsequently overturned the disciplinary action,
and the arbitrator not only reinstated the officer, but awarded him
back pay. 26 Similarly, an arbitrator ordered a D.C. officer to be
rehired even after he was criminally convicted of sexually abusing
a teenage girl in his squad car. These egregious examples illustrate
that “police disciplinary appeals have forced communities to rehire
police officers deemed unfit for duty by their supervisors.” 27 In
short, binding arbitration gives too much authority to arbitrators to
reinstate ineffectual officers.
Despite the role that police supervisors, city council
members, and mayors play in local politics, it is arbitrators who
generally have final authority when it comes to police disciplinary
actions. 28 Although officers are owed independent due process, this
interest must be balanced with the public’s growing need for
transparency in areas of police accountability. In Minnesota, the
Legislature intended to address this need and create substantive
change by enacting a new statute. Unfortunately, the statute falls
20

Id. at 553.
Id. at 553.
22
Id. at 578.
23
Id. at 550; see also Conor Friedersdorf, How Police Unions and
Arbitrators Keep Abusive Cops on the Streets, ATLANTIC (Dec. 2, 2014),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/12/how-police-unions-keepabusive-cops-on-the-street/383258/ [https://perma.cc/2WS5-LWRV].
24
Rushin, Police Disciplinary Appeals, supra note 15, at 550.
25
Id.
26
Id.
27
Id. at 550–51.
28
Id. at 552.
21
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terribly short of its goal and will not create meaningful change. It is
analyzed in turn below.
IV.

MINNESOTA STATUTORY CHANGES TO ARBITRATION

Following the killing of George Floyd, 29 the Minnesota
Legislature passed the Minnesota Police Accountability Act, which
affects arbitration procedures. 30 But, as written, it will not create
any meaningful change to the disciplinary review process of
officers. The new statute carves out a provision for “Peace Officer
Grievance Arbitration Selection Procedure” 31 and states:
The grievance procedure for all collective bargaining
agreements covering peace officers on or after the
day following final enactment must include the
arbitrator selection procedure established in this
section. 32
This clause is important because the statute will supersede
the current Minneapolis police union contract. The police union
contract, which is still in effect but subject to renegotiation, states,
“[i]f the matter is to be arbitrated, a single arbitrator shall be selected
from the panel of mutually agreed upon arbitrators.” 33 The clause
also states that the arbitrator will be selected from the panel on a
rotating basis and that the “Employer and Federation shall select an
29
On May 25, 2020, George Floyd was killed in police custody. He
was pinned to the ground outside of a convenience store while police officer
Derek Chauvin had his knee on Floyd’s neck for over eight minutes. The
incident was captured on video and set off nationwide protests about racism and
police brutality. See Evan Hill et al., How George Floyd was Killed in Police
Custody, NEW YORK TIMES (May 31, 2020, updated Nov. 1, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/31/us/george-floyd-investigation.html
[https://perma.cc/MYL8-JBM4].
30
H.F. No. 1, 91st Leg., 2nd Spec. Sess. (Minn. 2020); MINN. STAT. §
626.892 (2021).
31
Id. § 626.892, subd. 2(b).
32
Id.
33
See Labor Agreement Between the City of Minneapolis and the
Police Officers’ Federation of Minneapolis 8, subd. 3 (2017–2019) (on file with
author) (emphasis added) [hereinafter Labor Agreement].
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arbitrator using the alternate strike method with the party exercising
the first strike selected by a coin flip.” 34 Accordingly, the police
union (or the police officer) has some say in who the arbitrator will
be. In other words, they have input in who will decide their
disciplinary appeal. Notably, the new state law eliminates this
provision. 35
Although the 2020 Minnesota Police Accountability Act
eliminates the alternate strike method, the police union nonetheless
has some input over the selection of the arbitrator. The current law,
effective August 1, 2020, states that the commissioner—defined as
the Bureau of Mediation Services—will appoint a roster of six
people “in consultation with the community and law enforcement
stakeholders” to become arbitrators for police officers. 36 The
arbitrators will be subject to three-year terms but may be reappointed. Notably, the arbitrators may not simultaneously serve as
labor arbitrators to ensure that they are clearly established
neutrals. 37 Moreover, under the “Selection of Arbitrators,” the law
says arbitrators will cycle through a rostered list of arbitrators
alphabetically and that the parties will not have a say in choosing an
arbitrator. 38 But this section is misleading. After all, the police
federation still has input regarding who the original six rostered
arbitrators will be.
This Minnesota law restricts arbitration for only police
officer grievances and because this carve-out is for state employees
only, it is legal. 39 Accordingly, the Revised Uniform Arbitration Act
(RUAA) governs here. While the National Labor Rights Act
(“NLRA”) and the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) govern most
labor contracts outside the public sector—as well as the rare
circumstances of intrastate commerce where the commerce clause
does not apply—the state arbitration act governs police officers
because they are state public employees. 40 Because states retain
34

Id.
MINN. STAT. § 626.892 (2021).
36
Id.
37
Telephone Interview with Bill Pentelovitch, Attorney, (Aug. 7,
35

2020).
38

MINN. STAT. § 626.892, subd. 11 (2021).
Id.
40
Pentelovitch, supra note 37.
39
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sovereignty under the Tenth Amendment, states may make laws that
govern the management of their own employees. 41 But if, for
example, the clause instead had a provision that stated that “all
arbitration must follow the arbitrator selection process established,”
then that state law would be struck down because it would be
preempted by the FAA. 42 So while many state procedural
protections regarding arbitration have been deemed unlawful, 43
states do retain rights for purely intrastate activities. 44 In sum,
because this statute narrows the scope of application to a collective
bargaining agreement for Minnesota police officers—intrastate
public employees—and it does not otherwise conflict with the FAA,
the law is valid. 45
V.

ARBITRATION AS PROCEDURAL PROTECTIONS FOR OFFICERS

In Rushin’s extensive research on national police
disciplinary appeals in police contracts, he creates a helpful
framework for analyzing arbitration protocols as one form of
procedural protection for officers. 46 In his study, he outlines and
analyzes the following four variables:
(1) Police disciplinary actions are appealable to
arbitration.
(2) Arbitrators are given expansive authority,
like de novo review, and may rehear legal or
factual
determinations
that
police
supervisors made (ex: by the police chief, a
civilian review board, or city officials).
(3) The police union or the police officer has
some control over the selection of the
arbitrator.

41

Id.
Id.
43
See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 16–17 (1984).
44
See CARBONNEAU & BLAIR, supra note 13, at 199; see also
Pentelovitch, supra note 37.
45
Id.
46
Rushin, Police Disciplinary Appeals, supra note 15, at 569.
42
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(4) The arbitrator’s decision is final and
binding. 47
Accordingly, in the expansive dataset that Rushin used,
about half (48%) of all union contracts gave police officers all four
procedural protections. 48 Additionally, seventy-one percent of the
police union contracts in the dataset provided three procedural
protections. 49
Minnesota previously had all four levels of procedural
protections: (1) the police disciplinary action was appealable to
arbitration; (2) arbitrators had expansive de novo review; (3) the
police federation helped to establish a designated list of “acceptable
arbitrators” and allowed parties to alternatively strike arbitrator
names off the list between employer and the federation; and (4) the
arbitrator’s decision was considered final and binding. 50
The new state statute alters the third procedural protection
regarding the roster of arbitrators by creating a rotating list of six
arbitrators with no preemptive strikes. 51 However, the federation
still influences who the appointed six arbitrators will be. 52 So while
places limitations on who will arbitrate, the police federation still
retains some input.
Moreover, according to Rushin’s findings, this adjustment
does not set Minneapolis as a more accountable institution. 53
Rather, this new law merely brings Minnesota into accordance with
other police union contracts across the country—a subpar measure
for a city trying to enact meaningful change. Again, seventy-one
percent of the police union contracts in the dataset provided three
procedural protections. 54 The three most used procedural
protections in police union contracts are (1) the disciplinary action
is appealable to arbitration (72.9%); (2) the arbitrator has significant

47

Id.
Id. at 571.
49
Id.
50
Labor Agreement, supra note 33.
51
MINN. STAT. § 626.892, subd. 11 (2021).
52
Id. § 626.892, subd. 4 (2021).
53
See Rushin, Police Disciplinary Appeals, supra note 15, at 571.
54
Id.
48
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authority to review the disciplinary action (70.1%); and (3) the
arbitrator’s decision is final and binding (68.8%). 55
Minnesota’s minor adjustment to the arbitration provision
will not make any meaningful difference because arbitrators will
still have the same broad authority to reinstate officers that they
have always had. Simply put, Minnesota is not in a position to curry
favor by simply replicating the status quo. What is needed in this
moment is to alter procedural protections that allow for more police
accountability and transparency. Only then can there be meaningful
conversations about public trust. Accordingly, Minnesota should
make further changes to its arbitration provisions relating to police
discipline. There are many models across the country to consider,
and below is a survey of alternative measures and an analysis of
their benefits and drawbacks. While public trust is ethereal, making
substantive changes to police procedural protections—as suggested
below—does hold promise.
VI.

PROPOSAL 1: RELY ON DEMOCRATICALLY ACCOUNTABLE
ACTORS

Public trust between police officers and communities has
significantly eroded, which makes layered procedural protections
even more problematic. 56 As it stands, the current procedural
protections for officers are insular and ultimately, this is
disrespectful of community needs. 57
One consideration is to get rid of arbitrators in the police
disciplinary appeal process all together. 58 Police officers could
instead appeal to those who are democratically accountable, like
city council, or a civilian review board. 59 For example, if an officer
wants to appeal their disciplinary action in Fountain Valley,
California, they go to the police chief and then the city manager—
and beyond that, in rare circumstances, the appeal can be heard by
city council. 60 In Lincoln, Nebraska, police officers appeal to the
55

Id.
Id. at 588.
57
Id.
58
Id. at 589.
59
Id. at 590.
60
Id.
56
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city’s Personnel Board. 61 The public largely benefits because the
city manager or city council members are democratically elected
leaders, and so the people’s voice carries more weight. Eliminating
the arbitrator’s role in public disciplinary appeals has the benefit of
placing consequential decisions in the hands of democratically
accountable actors, and perhaps public trust too. But this solution
does risk putting officers in the way of politically expedient
solutions, which does not always provide meaningful protection or
due process.
Alternatively, many cities make appellate arbitration merely
advisory. Modifying arbitration to be an advisory opinion rather
than a binding decision may satisfy both officers’ need for neutrality
and the public’s need for accountability. 62 Cities would retain some
power in the arbitration process, while police officers might feel
their procedural due process rights were better preserved by a third
party neutral. 63
Additionally, some cities allow arbitrator decisions to be
overturned by city leaders, which limits the power of the arbitrator.
Others offer hybrid possibilities for police officers appealing to
arbitration, like in Oceanside, California. 64 There, for minor
disciplinary actions an officer may appeal to binding arbitration, but
in cases of serious misconduct the arbitration decision is merely
advisory. 65 The benefit of this compromise illustrates the city’s
commitment to its public by providing police accountability in
serious misconduct cases. 66 However, this solution creates
questions about how to classify misconduct and the challenge of
differentiating between minor and major misconduct.
In sum, the arbitrator’s role in police disciplinary appeals
can be entirely eliminated or significantly narrowed. Replacing
binding arbitration decisions with an advisory opinion would allow
democratically accountable actors, like those elected to city
government, to play a role in police disciplinary decisions. 67
61

Id.
Id.
63
Id. at 591.
64
Id.
65
Id.
66
Id.
67
Id.
62

128

VII.

PROPOSAL II: LIMIT THE SCOPE OF THE ARBITRATOR’S
AUTHORITY

Another possibility is for Minnesota to limit the scope of the
arbitrator’s authority. In court, most appellate tribunals defer to the
lower court’s findings of fact. 68 However, an arbitrator’s scope of
review is rarely limited. Instead, arbitrators generally have
expansive authority to review a case de novo. 69 And because
arbitration is generally less formal than traditional litigation,
arbitrators have the authority to exercise discretion over many
aspects of the proceedings. 70 This ultimately vests the arbitrator
with extensive authority to overrule democratically accountable
actors. 71
One way to limit the scope of authority an arbitrator has on
appeal is to limit the standard of review. For example, in
Bloomington, Illinois, arbitrators are to uphold police suspensions
unless they are “arbitrary, unreasonable or unrelated to the needs of
the service.” 72 In Eugene, Oregon, arbitrators are only to determine
whether the actions of the city were “reasonably consistent with
City and departmental guidelines.” 73 In Fullerton, California, the
arbitrator may not overrule or modify the punishment unless the
arbitrator finds that the penalty was “arbitrary, capricious,
discriminatory, or otherwise unreasonable.” 74 In Grand Rapids,
Michigan, an arbitrator may overturn a decision that the city made
on a disciplinary appeal; however, in cases where there is evidence
of police misconduct, the arbitrator cannot alter or reduce the
punishment. 75 Similarly, in Ocala, Florida, if the department shows
“good cause for discipline,” the arbitrator cannot adjust the
punishment rendered by the city. 76 These examples illustrate how

68

Id. at 578.
Id. at 576.
70
Id.
71
Id. at 577.
72
Id. at 592.
73
Id.
74
Id.
75
Id.
76
Id.
69
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cities can narrow the scope of authority an arbitrator has by
modifying the standard of review.
Simply put, Minnesota must reduce the scope of arbitrator’s
power. The Minnesota legislature can, and should, statutorily
narrow the scope of the arbitrator’s authority in this way. 77
Moreover, this provision could also be agreed upon and placed in a
police union contract. Limiting the arbitrator’s authority makes
sense. How and to what degree is an important question, but the
fact that the arbitrator can rehear factual findings and their decision
is binding illustrates two of Rushin’s police procedural protection
metrics. Giving arbitrators this much discretion insulates police
officers from being held accountable by their supervisors and
hinders a police chief’s ability to manage the work environment.
VIII.

POLICE UNIONS: PENDULUM SWING OF POWER

One way to create substantial change is to alter the
arbitration process in the police union contract. After all, arbitration
is a creature of contract. If parties mutually agree to provisions, then
that too can create real reform. However, it is always challenging
when asking a party to give up power in the name of equity. One
fundamental issue is how to balance police officers’ due process
rights with respect for the public’s need for transparency and
accountability.
While in many ways police unions are unexceptional in that
they advocate for better working conditions like better job safety,
higher pay, and checks on supervisor’s power to discipline, they are
fundamentally different from other unions because they are
sanctioned to use violence and even kill civilians. 78 Moreover, for
decades, police unions have built up layers of procedural protections
around discipline, seemingly more so than any other union.
Police unions amassed power through their ability to use
money and union dues to effectively lobby in the political process.
For example, in Minneapolis, R.T. Rybak ran for mayor and was
77

Id.
Aaron Bekemeyer, Limits on Use of Force is a Better Solution than
Banning Police Unions, STAR TRIBUNE (June 9, 2020, 5:55 PM),
https://www.startribune.com/limits-on-use-of-force-is-a-better-solution-thanbanning-police-unions/571144372/[ https://perma.cc/6C6R-U8C4].
78
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elected in 2002. 79 At that time, the Minneapolis Police Federation
endorsed him. 80 Yet once Rybak was elected, he shrank the police
budget and did not appoint the Federation’s preference for chief;
this upset the federation and in the 2005 election the Federation
spent $44,000 on anti-Rybak ads and another $27,000 to support his
challenger. 81
Moreover, police union leaders often exhibit “bulldog”
mentalities. For example, the long-time president of the Minneapolis
Police Federation, Lt. Bob Kroll, was well-known for “open rebellion
against city leaders.”82 Janeé Harteau, Minneapolis police chief from
2012 to 2017, explains this standpoint: “The union’s perspective is
we need to support the cops no matter what. I support good work,
but we cannot support or condone those that do not do a good job
or act consistent with our core beliefs and values.” 83 It is widely
recognized by city leaders and scholars alike that police unions’
defensive approach is a hurdle to reform. So, the question remains:
how can police union contracts balance requirements of both due
process and accountability? Changes to the collective bargaining
process may be the answer.
State statutes often define the scope of collective bargaining
broadly, and Minnesota is no different. In Minnesota, the Public
Employment Labor Relations Act (PELRA) sets rules for
Minnesota public employers and public employees. 84 PERLA
allows public employees the right to unionize and the right to
collectively bargain. 85 Under Minnesota Statutes section 179A.06,
subdivision 5 (2021), public employees, through their
79
Andy Mannix & Libor Jany, After Decades of the Minneapolis
Police Union Wielding Clout, the Entire Department is Now at Risk, STAR
TRIBUNE (June 14, 2020, 7:23 PM), https://www.motherjones.com/crimejustice/2020/08/qualified-immunity-ruling-judge-carlton-reeves/.
80
Id.
81
Id.
82
Id.
83
Id.
84
Public Employment Labor Relations Act, MINN. STAT. §§ 179A.01–
.25 (2021).
85
Id. See also Minnesota House Research Department, Collective
Bargaining/PELRA, MINNESOTA LEGISLATURE (July, 2016),
https://www.house.leg.state.mn.us/hrd/issinfo/gvst_colbg.aspx
[https://perma.cc/S2T3-7S3W].
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representative, are required to meet and negotiate with their
employer in good faith “regarding grievance procedures and the
terms and conditions of employment.” 86 However, neither party is
required to make any concessions. 87
A union’s ability to collectively bargain holds immense
sway. While only a few courts have considered the issue of whether
disciplinary procedures fall within the scope of “terms of
employment,” it seems like the consensus is that many courts
believe disciplinary procedures are “an appropriate subject of
collective bargaining.” 88 This power implicates how police
contracts are formed. For example, Minnesota’s police union
contract gives police officers a number of procedural protections,
including investigation protections and indemnification of
officers. 89
Rushin recommends that state labor laws be amended to
provide community involvement and transparency in police
department disciplinary actions. 90 He suggests three possible
models: (1) the Legislature can amend state labor law that disallows
police disciplinary procedures to be subject to collective bargaining;
(2) states could mandate that cities create a notice and comment
period before agreeing to a disciplinary protocol in the collective
bargaining process—creating a process similar to administrative
agencies; and (3) states could also require cities to host negotiations
for disciplinary protocols in public places, effectively creating a
public hearing. 91
The Minnesota Legislature could also explicitly include
discipline or the arbitration process as part of the city’s managerial
rights. Right now, Minnesota’s definition of management rights is
86

MINN. STAT. § 179A.06, subd. 5 (2021).
Id.
88
Stephen Rushin, Police Union Contracts, DUKE L. REV., 1191, 1206
(2017) [hereinafter Rushin, Police Union Contracts].
89
Andrew Luger, Patricia Dunn, Ronald Sharpe, & Rasha Gerges
Shields, Jones Day Webinar: Transforming the Minneapolis Police Department:
Reviewing the Minneapolis Police Contract – and Comparing It With Those of
Other Cities (July 28, 2020), 5 (PowerPoint on file with author) [hereinafter
Jones Day PowerPoint].
90
See generally Rushin, Police Union Contracts, supra note 88, at
1199–1200.
91
Id. at 1203–1207, 1244.
87
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only stated generically and does not expressly note which rights the
city has retained. 92 But under subdivision one, Inherent Managerial
Policy, “[a] public employer is not required to meet and negotiate
on matters of inherent managerial policy.” 93 Accordingly, inherent
managerial policy is not subject to collective bargaining; so the city
would increase its ability to achieve reform because discipline
would not be subject to further police contract renegotiations every
few years. 94 Some cities, such as Denver, have done just that and
narrowed the definition of grievance in the collective bargaining
contract: they excluded disciplinary action from the grievance
procedure, creating more public accountability. 95 Minnesota could
follow suit.
Another possibility to promote police discipline
transparency is for the Legislature to limit what can be collectively
bargained. For example, collective bargaining could be limited to
wages and employment, with specific language to exclude
discipline. 96 Alternatively, if the managerial clause in the police
union contract specifically designated discipline as “inherent
managerial policy,” it would not be subject to collective bargaining
negotiations. 97 Moreover, police union contracts often happen in
private—to that extent, changes could be enacted to demand (a) that
negotiations include a public hearing aspect, or (b) the contract be
subject to a notice and comment period.
Additionally, the Legislature could further curtail
arbitration. As the Legislature has already shown, states can enact
arbitration laws that affect police officers so long as the law enacted
is not preempted by the FAA and does not illustrate hostility
towards arbitration. The Minnesota Police Accountability Act does
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not create substantive change regarding the scope of an arbitrator’s
power to overrule disciplinary decisions. In fact, Minnesota
arguably still has all four procedural protections under Rushin’s
analysis. The Legislature should either make the arbitration decision
advisory or make it appealable to democratically elected actors—
or, ideally, do both.
IX.

OTHER PROCEDURAL PROTECTIONS FOR OFFICERS

Other procedural protections play a significant role in
disciplinary reform. While each topic deserves in-depth analysis,
this paper will briefly mention a few noteworthy protections.
Qualified immunity makes a government official exempt
from a liability, even if they deprive the constitutional rights of
another, so long as the official’s actions is not contrary to case law
that is “clearly established.” 98 In police brutality and misconduct
cases, the issue is that in granting qualified immunity “it sets up a
noteworthy catch-22, in which officials cannot be found liable if no
one has ever been found liable for precisely the same conduct
before.” 99 Recently, Judge Reeves of the U.S. District Court in the
Southern District of Mississippi issued an extraordinary opinion
thrashing qualified immunity. 100 In Jamison v. McClendon, Judge
Reeves began by citing nineteen Black people from across the
country who were doing benign things—like jaywalking, coming
home from work, and even eating ice cream in bed—who were then
killed by police officers. 101 He stated:
Tragically, thousands have died at the hands of law
enforcement over the years, and the death toll
continues to rise. Countless more have suffered from
other forms of abuse and misconduct by police.
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Qualified immunity has served as a shield for these
officers, protecting them from accountability.
***
But let us not be fooled by legal jargon. Immunity is
not exoneration. And the harm in this case to one
man sheds light on the harm done to the nation by
this manufactured doctrine.
As the Fourth Circuit concluded, “This has to
stop.” 102
Additionally, statutory rights like the Law Enforcement
Officers Bill of Rights (LEOBORs) are a set of laws that create
more procedural protections for officers. In Minnesota, it is called
the Peace Officer Discipline Procedures Act, and similar laws are
present in at least fifteen other states. 103 For example, in Minnesota,
when there is an investigation of misconduct, police have additional
statutory rights under Peace Officer Discipline Procedures Act. 104
Additionally, the officer is “entitled to copies of any witness
statements in the possession of the other party” and “is entitled to a
copy of the investigating agency's investigative report.” 105 These
protections are too far-reaching. Moreover, under subdivision 17, a
civilian review board or other oversight body is prohibited from
having “the authority to make a finding of fact.” 106 They are further
prohibited from making a “determination regarding a complaint
against an officer,” and cannot impose discipline an officer. 107 In
sum, there is little room for democratic oversight.
There are simply too many procedural protections in place
to protect police officers. Ending qualified immunity and statutory
LEOBORs would create robust and speedy reform. These actions
are important, though ancillary, to also restructuring police
disciplinary arbitration practices.
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X.

REFRAMING & RE-ENVISIONING

The issue of police disciplinary action must be reframed. It
is not only about the power of arbitration to overrule disciplinary
decisions, but also about (1) the police union’s power to collectively
bargain, (2) the protective statutory provisions of the Law
Enforcement Officer Bill of Rights, and (3) the judge-made doctrine
of qualified immunity. The aggregate effect of these policies gives
officers tremendous protection, and the “expansive reading of state
labor laws” has ultimately “opened the door for police unions to
negotiate the inclusion of a range of questionable procedures that
may ‘protect incompetent or abusive employees.’” 108 It is clear that
there need to be fewer procedural protections for police officers.
Much of the effort to provide police officers with procedural
protections centers upon them receiving due process. The right to
appeal a disciplinary action is an important procedural protection in
itself. 109 However, as Rushin emphasizes, “these disciplinary
appeals procedures should not insulate officers from basic
accountability at the expense of the broader community.” 110
Minneapolis is “failing to strike a reasonable balance” between the
two competing goals of due process and community transparency
and accountability. 111 After all, civilians are owed due process, too.
XI.

DISRUPTING THE PENDULUM SWING: THE ROLE OF
COLLABORATIVE REFORM

Few would dispute that police officers have a difficult job.
Police scholars note that officers “must cope not only with the terror
of an often hostile and unpredictable citizenry, but also with a
hostile—even tyrannical—and unpredictable bureaucracy.” 112 As a
result, many police officers “are quite dedicated unionists precisely
because they see the union as necessary to protect their interests in
fair process and in having a voice in the workplace.” 113 However,
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the fair process has long since eclipsed other competing values, and
the number of procedural protections is unconscionable—some
procedural protections must be repealed.
In June of 2020 Minneapolis Police Chief Medaria
Arradondo announced that he was withdrawing from police union
contract negotiations in order to better examine the role the police
union contract plays in implementing reform. 114 He stated:
It will take time, but I am confident that by being
both vulnerable in shaping a new paradigm of
peacekeeping and courageous in identifying and
tearing down those barriers that have crippled
relationships with our communities and that have
eroded trust, we will have a police department that
our communities view is legitimate, trusting, and
working with their best interests at heart. 115
Chief Arrandondo’s willingness to publicly announce
“vulnerability” as a virtue and his recognition that the police
department must partake in “shaping a new paradigm” illustrates a
willingness to think about the wellbeing of both officers and the
public.
But there is much to reshape. Police unions—and unions in
general—amplify one voice in negotiations, and as a result they risk
losing the nuance in complex issues. Reform efforts often follow
this same top-down approach and hierarchy plays a role even in the
language itself, with police described as “rank and file officers.” 116
Still, real reform will not occur without the officers themselves. The
quote “nothing without us is for us” is grounded in civil rights work,
yet its meaning carries weight in any setting seeking change.
Notably, “the insights and creativity of rank-and-file officers can
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[help] revolutionize policing.” 117 For that reason, “police need to be
involved in improving police practices.” 118
It is worth asking, then, what other process might honor
fairness and accountability, while also giving greater opportunity
for officers to share their perspectives? Instead of arbitration,
perhaps mediation or restorative practices should play a role in
police discipline. Minnesota is uniquely positioned to do this, with
numerous community mediation centers throughout the state that
offer both mediation and restorative practices. 119
XII.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, the numerous procedural protections afforded
to officers—be it through contract, statute, or judicial precedent—
hinder police accountability efforts and reform. Accordingly, the
Minnesota Legislature should rescind some of these procedural
protections that shield officers. They can end qualified immunity by
creating a Section 1983 state analogue; they can reexamine the
Peace Officer Disciplinary Procedures or adjust police unions’
power to collectively bargain; or, as discussed at length in this
paper, the Legislature can limit the role of arbitration. Although
arbitration is only one part of police discipline and accountability,
narrowing the scope of arbitration is crucial to restoring social trust
and promoting justice.
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